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INTRODUCTION

II.

Understandably desperate to divert attention from the merits of Tacke’s appeal, the Trust
mainly contests jurisdiction. The Trust primarily

Judgment”) was

a ﬁnal

of Appeal untimely.

judgment

By

contrast,

asserts that the

August 21, 2018 Judgment (the “2018

that started the time to initiate an appeal, rendering Tacke’s Notice

Tacke contends that the January 24, 2019 Amended Judgment (the

“2019 Judgment”) was a ﬁnal judgment. As explained below, the 2019 Judgment was the ﬁrst judgment
to resolve the Trust’s

$136k breach-of—contract claim for unpaid

2019 Judgment had judgment been entered on

by or

against the parties,

interest.

Thus, only upon entry of the

claims for relief (other than costs and fees) asserted

all

making the 2019 Judgment a ﬁnal judgment. Since Tacke ﬁled a motion

reconsider Within fourteen days of the 2019

Judgment and

of the order resolving the motion to reconsider,

this

a Notice of

to

Appeal Within forty-two days

Court has jurisdiction and the

issues presented

have been properly preserved.

BACKGROUND

III.

Tacke incorporates the Background portion of

his

opening brief (Part

supplemented or modiﬁed below. Capitalized terms herein are the same
Jurisdiction in this case depends primarily

Court understand the timeline

as to

When

a ﬁnal

III)

as those in the

herein as

opening

brief.

on When a ﬁnal judgment was entered. To help the

judgment was entered, the following events

are

most

germane:

2/9/17

The Trust ﬁled

its

Amended

Complaint, Which includes a single cause of action for

breach of contract. In addition to a repayment of $500,000,
interest” based

5/16/18

The

on the terms of the Agreement. (R.

district court

essentially

entered a

Memorandum

unopposed motion

for

seeks “prejudgment

at 31.)

Decision and Order granting the Trust’s

summary judgment on

its

breach-of—contract claim,

holding that the Trust was entitled to $500,000 with interest at

Appellant’s Brief

it

5% per year.

(R. at 93.)
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The district court entered an Order granting the Trust’s second unopposed motion for
summary judgment. The Order dismissed all ofTacke’s counterclaims. (R. at 152.) On

8/21/18

same day, the Court issued the 2018 Judgment, Which awarded $500,000 in
damages plus post—judgment interest and dismissed Tacke’s counterclaims. (R. at 154.)
that

The Trust ﬁled its Motion for Prejudgment Interest seeking $136,027.40 in interest.
(R. at 200.) The Motion was supported by a declaration by the Trust’s attorney, Which

8/29/18

included an exhibit calculating the amount claimed. (R. at 186, 196.)

The

1/23/19

district court

granted the Trust’s motions for costs and fees as well as the Motion

for Prejudgrnent Interest. (R. at 221—22.)

The

1/24/19

district court

entered the 2019 Judgment, Which included for the ﬁrst time an

award of “[p]rejudgment

interest” of $136,027.40. (R. at 224.)

Tacke, through his newly appeared attorney (undersigned) ﬁled the Second Motion

2/7/19

for Reconsideration. (R. at 226.)

The

2/12/19

district court

issues in the

entered an interlocutory Order stating that some but not

Second Motion

for Reconsideration

were untimely

all

of the

raised. (R. at

295—

96.)

The Trust ﬁled an

2/15/19

opposition brief to the Second Motion for Reconsideration. (R. at

298.)

The

2/27/19

district court

held a hearing on the Second Motion for Reconsideration and

allowed the parties to submit supplemental brieﬁng.

The Trust ﬁled a supplemental brief opposing the Second Motion for Reconsideration.

3/5/19

(R. at 332.)

The

3/26/19

district

court entered an

Order ﬁnally resolving the Second Motion

for

Reconsideration. (R. at 354.)

Tacke ﬁled

5/6/19

his

Notice of Appeal. (R.

In his opening brief, Tacke

in this case, but the

commented

at 358.)

that three motions for reconsideration

Trust correctly pointed out that

this

is

had been ﬁled

untrue. References to the “Third

Reconsideration Motion” in the opening brief should be read to refer to the Second Motion for

Reconsideration. Undersigned apologizes for the confusion.

Appellant’s Brief
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ARGUMENT

IV.

This Court Has Jurisdiction

A.

An

appellant must ﬁle a notice of appeal Within forty—two days of an appealable judgment.

I.A.R. 14(3). In a civil case, a Rule 54(3) ﬁnal judgment

The January

24, 2019

Amended Judgment

starts

an appealable judgment. I.A.R. 11(a)(1).

(the “2019 Judgment”), if

have caused the appeal period to expire on March

“affect

is

7,

2019. However,

any ﬁndings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment

on the day the

district court enters

Tacke ﬁled the Second Motion

Tacke had until

explained below,

it

The

question, therefore,

if

a

motion

is

ﬁled that could

in the action,” the forty—two-day period

is

on February

7,

this case,

2019, and the district court did not

26, 2019. (R. at 226, 354.)

Measured from

that date,

Fano, 157 Idaho 428, 433, 337 P.3d 587, 592 (2014)

Whether the 2019 Judgment was a ﬁnal judgment. As

was a ﬁnal judgment because

for relief seeking allegedly

it

was the ﬁrst judgment to resolve the Trust’s claim

unpaid interest under the Agreement.

The 2019fudgment Was a Finalfudgment

1.

The

March

May 7, 2019, to appeal. See Stz'bal v.

(citing I.A.R. 14(a)).

was a ﬁnal judgment, would

an order resolving the motion. I.A.R. 14(a). In

for Reconsideration

enter an order resolving the motion until

it

ﬁrst step in identifying a ﬁnal

are judgments.

To be a judgment,

a

judgment

is

to determine

document must comply With

Which documents

Civil Rule 54(a),

in the record

Which requires that

a judgment:

(1)

Be

(2)

Be

set forth in a separate

entitled

document. I.R.C.P. 58.

“Judgment” or “Decree” and begin With the words

ENTERED AS FOLLOWS.” Doe

1).

“JUDGMENT

IS

Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 663—64, 315 P.3d 848, 851—

52 (2013) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(3)).

(3)

Not

contain “a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior

proceedings, the court’s legal reasoning, ﬁndings of fact, or conclusions of law.” Estate

Appellant’s Brief
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ofHollcmd

Metro. Prop.

‘v.

69°

Idaho 94, 99, 279 P.3d 80, 85 (2012)

Cas. Ins. C0., 153

(quoting I.R.C.P. 54(a)).
State the relief granted “on

(4)

face.” Roesch

its

‘v.

Klemann, 155 Idaho

175, 180,

307 P.3d

192, 197 (2013) (quotation omitted).

Applying these

rules, there are

only two documents in the record that could possibly qualify

judgments: the 2018 Judgment and the 2019 Judgment. While

might be ﬁnal judgments, only the 2019 Judgment

it

a ﬁnal

is

may

all

no judgment yet stated the

Which the Trust was entitled on

relief to

at ﬁrst

judgment because,

judgment had not been entered on

claims for relief asserted

appear

by or

as

glance that both

until

its

entry,

against the parties. Speciﬁcally,

its

claim for unpaid interest under

the Agreement.

“The

title

of a document alone does not determine Whether

it is

a ﬁnal

Fork Ditch C0., 137 Idaho 850, 867, 55 P.3d 304, 321 (2002). Instead, ajudgrnent

has been entered on

all

claims for

relief,

However,

relief.

the action

by documents

Taylor

all

is

7).

judgment

“ﬁnal”

is

all

if

not ﬁnal unless relief has been entered on

judgments (known

v.

E.

“judgment

parties in the

need not be a single judgment that enters

that each separately qualify as

relief

on

all

all

the claims in

as “partial

judgments”).

162 Idaho 692, 704—05, 403 P.3d 636, 648—49 (2017). This Court strictly requires that

claims for relief asserted

ﬁnal.

all

Riley,

a

is

except costs and fees, asserted by or against

action.” I.R.C.P. 54(a). In other words, there

claims for

judgment. Camp

by every party be resolved

Eg. Camp, 137 Idaho

at 868, 55

P.3d

at

in

one or more judgments before a judgment

322 (holding that no ﬁnal judgment was entered until

claims in the complaint were resolved); Goldman

v.

Graham, 139 Idaho 945, 947, 88 P.3d 764, 766

(2004) (holding that an order was not a ﬁnal judgment because the plaintiff’s negligence claim

remained unresolved);

Taylor, 162

judgments became ﬁnal only

Appellant’s Brief

Idaho

at 647,

after all claims

403 P.3d

at

647 (holding that a

were dismissed); Cook

7).

series

of partial

Arias, 164 Idaho 766, 767,

435
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P.3d 1086, 1087 (2015) (noting that an order could not be a ﬁnal judgment because judgment had not

been entered on certain remaining

The 2018 Judgment was
substantive claim for

Judgment was

relief:

a partial

issues).

a partial judgment.

Upon

its

entry, there remained an unresolved

the Trust’s claim for interest accruing under the Agreement.

judgment because

it

did not address this claim at

(referring to a “partial judgment” as a judgment that does not resolve

The 2019 Judgment was

the ﬁnal judgment because

remaining unresolved claim for

Everyone agrees
Agreement. (R.

that the

at

33

11

relief:

The only

See I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1)

outstanding claims for

relief).

was the ﬁrst judgment to resolve the

the Trust’s damages claim for unpaid contractual interest.

Amended Complaint

11.)

it

all

all.

The 2018

sought damages for “prejudgment interest” under the

other judgment in the record, the 2018 Judgment, clearly did

not award any contractual interest as damages, only post-judgment interest. (R. at 154.) Since the 2019

Judgment granted
it

relief on that claim for the ﬁrst time,

was either an interlocutory order

(e.g.

it

was a ﬁnal judgment. Every order preceding

summary—judgment orders) or

a partial judgment (Le. the 2018

Judgment). Tacke then ﬁled the Second Motion to Reconsider on February

later. (R. at

226.)

That motion

7,

2019, fourteen days

reset the appeal clock until the district court resolved

2019, forty—one days before Tacke ﬁled the Notice of Appeal on

May

it

on March 26,

6,

2019. This appeal was

to suggest the 2018

Judgment was the ﬁnal

therefore timely. I.A.R. 14(a).

The 2018 judgment Was Not a Finaljudgment

2.

The Trust advances
judgment.

First, the

several arguments that

seem

Trust argues that the 2019 Judgment “did not

alter the material

terms” of the

2018 Judgment but merely ﬁxed an “omission,” and ﬁxing a minor omission does not extend the time
to appeal. (Resp. Br. 14.) This

Appellant’s Brief

argument

is

a red herring because the 2018

Judgment

is

not a ﬁnal
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judgment. The only thing that matters

is

Whether the 2018 Judgment entered judgment on

for relief in the action. I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1).

whether

it

The

ﬁnality of the 2018

all

claims

Judgment does not depend on

was materially altered by the 2019 Judgment.

Even

if it

did matter whether the 2019 Judgment materially altered the 2018 Judgment,

thereby renewing the time to ﬁle a motion to reconsider or an appeal, the 2019 Judgment dramatically

amended

the previous judgment.

An amended judgment

the substance of the earlier judgment;

it

extends the time to ﬁle an appeal

does not extend the appeal

identical to the original judgment.” State

7).

Window When

Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 308,

it is

if it affects

“substantively

246 P.3d 958, 961 (2010).

Examples of immaterial changes that do not extend the appeal window include “deleting unnecessary
and repetitive provisions,” Vierstm

7).

Vierstra, 153

Idaho 873, 874, 292 P.3d 264, 265 (2012), adding a

corrected ﬁling stamp, Ciccone, 150 Idaho at 308, 246 P.3d at 961, changing the spelling of a litigant’s

name,

First

Nationwide Bank

v.

Summer Housefoint

Venture,

902 F.2d 1197, 1200 (5th Cir. 1990) (cited

in Ciccone), or correcting an execution date, U.S. v. Lewis, 921

in Ciccone). In each case, the

granted

Lloyd’s,

is

change did not

the most substantive

F.2d 563, 565 (5th

affect the relief granted

component of

on any claim, and the

a judgment. Cf. Harrison

7).

relief

Certain Underwriters at

London, 149 Idaho 201, 205, 233 P.3d 132, 136 (2010) (noting that a judgment must describe

the relief granted, not merely award “judgment” to one party). In this case,

Judgment granted

a

new award of $136,027.40

in contract damages.

material alteration (although, again, this question

The Trust

May

Cir. 1991) (also cited

16,

2018

asserts that the district court

Memorandum

Summary Judgment.

Appellant’s Brief

is

by

contrast, the 2019

Such an award

is

undoubtedly a

irrelevant).

had already awarded “prejudgment

interest” in the

Decision and Order, the order deciding the Trust’s ﬁrst Motion for

(Resp. Br. 15—16.) According to the Trust, interest damages were already
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“apparent on the record” and the 2019 Judgment merely “spoke the truth” about them. This argument

ignores the fact that

all

judgment motion, Which
that orders granting

is

merely interlocutory. I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1). This Court has repeatedly held

summary judgment do not

document

in a separate

summary-

claims for relief must be resolved in a judgment, not an order on a

constitute

judgments because

that complies with Rule 54(a). E.g. Idaho First Nat’l

Assam, Ina, 121 Idaho 356, 361, 825 P.2d 79, 84 (1992); Spokane

relief

Bank

must be entered
David Steed

v.

Structures, Inc. v. Equitable

148 Idaho 616, 619—20, 226 P.3d 1263, 1266—67 (2010); Capstar Radio Operating C0.

v.

1m)” LLC,

Lawrence, 149

Idaho 623, 625—26, 238 P.3d 223, 225—26 (2010). Thus, the fact that prejudgment interest

been addressed

in an interlocutory order does not

make the 2018 Judgment

{9°

may have

a ﬁnal judgment.1

Next, the Trust confusingly suggests that the Motion for Prejudgment Interest was actually a

Rule 60(a) or 60(b) motion that did not extend the time to ﬁle an appeal. (Resp. Br. 14—16.) This

argument can be dismissed out of hand because

prompted the

district court to enter the

was a ﬁnal judgment under Rule

54,

one from Minnesota, Geckler

which

from Florida,

‘v.

does not matter What kind of motion

2019 Judgment. All that matters

it

Last, the Trust quotes extensively

states:

it

Whether the 2019 Judgment

was.

from two intermediate appellate court cases from other

Samuelson, 438

Leila Corp. ofSt. Pete v. Ossi,

is

may have

N.W.2d 740 (Minn.

230 So. 3d 488

(Fla. Dist. Ct.

Ct.

App. 1989), and one

App. 2017). This Court can

ignore these authorities because they do not apply legal standards that substantially resemble Idaho

law.

1

Compare I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1) with Minn. R. CiV. P. 54.01 and Hillsboro Plantation

Tacke does not mean to suggest that the

a dollar

amount or address the

interest

was

to

be calculated. (R.

Appellant’s Brief

May 16,

fact that the

7).

2018 order resolved the prejudgment interest

Trust did not prove the value of the

Plunkett, 55 So.

issue. It

did not ﬁx

Commodity Basket upon Which

at 95.)
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2d 534, 536
face, the

(Fla. 1951) (setting forth a different standard for identifying a

ﬁnal judgment).

On

their

governing standards are simply not the same.

The Trust’s

cases are also readily distinguishable.

claim for relief arising from a contract; by contrast,

it

Minnesota and Florida

is,

cases

were procedural, that

Idaho, a ﬁnal judgment must adjudicate

all

The

Trust’s claim for interest

automatically applied by operation of law. In

Damages

for

by every

commodity

in an analogous context that

ofa claim

prices that

prejudgment interest

for relief. Seafackson Hop,

is

computed based on

changed over time. Accordingly,

“is

this

facts

Court ruled

not an expense of litigation but rather the subject

LLC v. Farm Bureau Mut.

459 (2015) (stating that prejudgment interest

party, With the only

unpaid interest are simply a breach—

of—contract claim like any other, especially in this case since interest was to be

outside the contract, namely

a substantive

appears the prejudgment interest awards in the

claims for relief asserted

exceptions being “costs and fees.” I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1).

is

Ins.,

158 Idaho 894, 897, 354 P.3d 456,

not an expense incurred by

[a]

party in the conduct

of the arbitration” (quotation omitted)).

On the

other hand, the prejudgment interest awards in the out—of—state cases were procedural.

In Minnesota, interest automatically accrues from the time of a verdict until judgment

Minn.

Stat. § 549.09(a)

every prevailing party

So.

2d

is

(West. 1988) (in effect

entitled to

212, 215 (Fla. 1985). Unlike

a mathematical computation.

of the

trial

prejudgment

damages

There

at the

is

is

entered. See

time of the Geckler case). Likewise, in Florida,

interest.

ﬂrgonaut

in this case, the

Ins. Co.

72.

May

prejudgment interest

no ‘ﬁnding of fact’ needed. Thus,

it is

Plumbing C0., 474

in Florida “is

merely

a purely ministerial duty

judge or clerk of the court to add the appropriate amount of interest to the principal amount

of damages.”

Appellant’s Brief

Id.

Thus, even

if

the out—of—state cases applied a standard similar to Idaho, the
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prejudgment interest

in those cases

was not a substantive claim for

relief like the Trust’s claim for

unpaid contractual interest damages.

Although the Trust would have

it is

not.

making

it

No

this

Court believe that jurisdiction

judgment resolved the Trust’s claims

for contract

in this case

damages

until the

complicated,

is

2019 Judgment,

the ﬁnal judgment. Tacke timely appealed from an order resolving his motion to reconsider,

which was ﬁled Within fourteen days of the ﬁnal judgment.

The

3.

District Court’s Initial

“Resolve” the Motion

On February 12,

Order 0n the Second Motion for Reconsideration Did Not

and Start

the

Appeal Clock

2019, just ﬁve days after Tacke ﬁled his Second

the district court entered an order stating that the Second

“prejudgment

interest, costs,

Judgment was

and attorney

a ﬁnal judgment. (R. at 295—96.)

Motion was untimely except

The Trust seemingly

for Reconsideration, starting Tacke’s appeal clock

the Court accepts this argument, the appeal

Window

district court’s

on February

closed on

March

argues that

Motion

as to

for Reconsideration in the

February

12,

if this

Court

order resolved the Second

12, 2019.

(Resp. Br. 18—19.) If

26, 2019, rendering the

2019 Notice of Appeal untimely. This argument holds no water because the

resolve the Second

for Reconsideration,

fees” because the district court mistakenly believed 2018

determines the 2019 Judgment to be a ﬁnal judgment, the

Motion

Motion

district court

May

did not

2019 Order.

Again, a timely ﬁled motion that could affect factual ﬁndings, legal conclusions, or judgments

in a case Will terminate the appeal period. I.A.R. 14(a).

The forty—two—day

date of the clerk’s ﬁling stamp on the order deciding such motion.”

February

12,

Id.

period restarts “upon the

The

question

is

Whether the

2019 Order “decided” the Second Motion for Reconsideration, thereby starting the

appeal period.

Appellant’s Brief
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The February
March

Order

26, 2019

2019 Order did not “decide” the Second Motion for Reconsideration, the

12,

Although the February 12 Order stated the Second Motion for

did.

Reconsideration was untimely as to some issues,

entirely. (R. at 295—96.) Instead,

prejudgment

interest, costs,

Trust ﬁled an opposition

and

brief,

it

mentioned that a hearing would occur on February

fees. (R. at 296.)

belying

its

(R. at 298.)

Then,

issues that

remained unaddressed in the

5,

entered an order addressing

on

27, 2019,

After entry of the February 12, 2019 Order, the

claim that the Second Motion had already been decided.

at the hearing, the district court solicited further

supplemental opposition brief on March

district court

did not purport to deny the Second Motion

it

briefs.

(See R.

at 354.)

2019. (R. at 332.)

all

brieﬁng from both parties on the

It

The Trust ﬁled

was not

the issues in the Second

until

March

its

extensive

26, 2019, that the

Motion and ﬁnally denying

it.

(R. at 354—56.)

In short, the Trust

though the Trust appeared

is

arguing that the Second Motion was decided on February 12, 2019, even

at a

hearing and ﬁled two briefs in opposition to the Second Motion after

that date. Similarly, the district court did not behave as if the

March

until that day,

B.

When

26, 2019,

March

it

26, 2019, rendering the

May

6,

The

until

appeal clock therefore did not start

2019 Notice of Appeal timely.

The Agreement Unambiguously Does Not Allow the Trust to Recover Money Damages
Missing the March 2015 Payment Because the Debt Converted to Equity
Tacke stands by

unambiguously

make

to receive equity in

Appellant’s Brief

his

argument

states that the

alleged failure to

is

issued an order deciding the motion.

Second Motion had been decided

the

Trust

is

in Section

VLB

IMS, not

of his opening brief that the Agreement

entitled to equity in

March 2015 payment. This

is

for

IMS, not money damages,

for Tacke’s

because the Trust’s remedy for nonpayment

cash. (See Appellant’s Br. 19—21.)
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The Trust responds
it

that

it

cannot be compelled to accept equity

does not want the equity. (Resp. Br. 23—24.)

as “speciﬁc

The Trust misunderstands

performance”

Tacke’s argument. Tacke

does not contend that the Trust must accept speciﬁc performance. Instead, Tacke contends that,

most, the Trust

in

is

entitled to

damages

IMS,

for not receiving equity in

the

if

remedy

it

at

agreed to accept

exchange for nonpayment. The Trust has never sought or proven such damages. Accordingly, the

Court’s damages award for “principal” and “interest” should be overturned.

C.

Agreement Does Not Unambiguously Convert the Debt
Ambiguous

Alternatively, If the

Agreement

The Trust
Motion
motion

Is

asserts that

for Reconsideration.

Tacke raised the ambiguity argument

The Trust contends

that

it is

to Equity, the

for the ﬁrst time in his

impermissible to raise a

Second

“claim” in a

new

to reconsider. (Resp. Br. 24—25.)

On

the contrary, arguing that a contract

is

ambiguous

is

not a

new

an argument. Motions to reconsider are exactly the mechanism by Which
should be raised.

“When

new evidence and arguments

considering a motion for reconsideration under Rule [11.2], the district court

should take into account any

on the correctness of the

claim for relief but merely

new

facts, law,

or information presented

district court's interlocutory order.

and the moving party can re-argue the same

by the moving party

However, new evidence

issues in addition to

is

that bear

not required

new arguments.” Arregui

z).

Gallegos-

Maz’n, 153 Idaho 801, 808, 291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the ambiguity issue was already before the
for Reconsideration

contended that debt would convert to equity. (R.

district court to enter

summary judgment on

at

the Trust’s contract claims,

determine Whether the Agreement was ambiguous. See State

316,

district court

7).

Partee, 165

because the First Motion

158—59, 210—11.) For the

it

necessarily

Idaho

320 (2019) (“In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed

Appellant’s Brief

511,

in

its

had

,

to ﬁrst

448 P.3d

plain, ordinary
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and proper sense, according

to the

meaning derived from the

a similar reason, the ambiguity issue

court’s interpretation of the

unambiguous

is

Agreement,

plain

necessarily before this Court as well.

this

Court

Will also

is

the district

is

squarely before this Court.

main argument

half—heartedly resists Tacke’s

To afﬁrm

have to decide Whether the Agreement

in the ﬁrst place. Consequently, the ambiguity issue

The Trust only

wording of the instrument”). For

that the

Agreement

at

most

is

ambiguous. Most notably, the Trust does not address the sentence on page 2 of the Agreement

providing that the debt

is

“secured by”

80% of IMS.

(R. at 276 (emphasis added).) See

LC.

§

28—9—

203(b)(3) (stating that a security interest can be created by an agreement that describes the collateral).

The Trust

also fails to address the standalone sentence

ownership

Will

will

remain

at

40%

extinguish thereafter.

interpretation,

until

(R.

March

at

80% of IMS would

276.)

15,

2023 or Bob’s passing” Without stating Whether the debt

Nor

ambiguous

D.

as to

between 2015 and 2023 even

The Court should

therefore hold that the

if

its

the

Agreement

Whether the debt converts to equity.

The Court Should Permit Tacke
The Trust does

case. Instead, the

does the Trust address the fact that, under

transfer gradually to the Trust

debt were repaid a single day late in March 2015.

is

on the same page that simply says the “Trust’s

to Present a

Mutual-Mistake Defense

at Trial

not dispute that there are strong grounds for a mutual—mistake defense in this

Trust merely asserts that mistake was not properly pled under I.R.C.P. 9(b). (Resp.

Br. 26—27.)

The

Trust’s

argument ignores that “pleadings should be

liberally construed in the interest

securing a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case.” Brown

802, 807, 229 P.3d 1164, 1169 (2010) (quotation omitted). In

P.3d

1 (2016),

Appellant’s Brief

Brown

7).

v. City ofPocatello,

of

148 Idaho

Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 335

the plaintiffs sought to reform a deed but failed to plead mutual mistake or to request
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reformation.

Id.

at 6,

judgment phase.

335 P.3d

The

Id.

at 160.

The

district court

come up

issue apparently did not

summary-

until the

amend

nonetheless denied the plaintiff’s request to

the

complaint to add a mutual—mistake claim, reasoning that the issues had been adequately pled anyway,

and

this

Court afﬁrmed.

Id. at 9,

defendant on notice of the claim.

335 P.3d

at 164.

This Court reasoned that the pleadings put the

denied that the Agreement called for repayment by March

pay

its

debt on the grounds that

was to receive equity
sufﬁciently pled.

if

Even

it

the debt was not paid. (R. at 51

if it

were

15,

had transferred ownership

not, the Trust

is

1H]

Answer and Counterclaim:

Tacke’s

Id. Similarly, in this case,

2015; (2) denied that

interest;

6—7; 54

and

11

8.)

IMS

had

failed to

(3) asserted that the

The matter was

Trust

therefore

well aware of the issue and can prepare for

depositions into the meaning of the contract have occurred and the Trust could be given

(1)

trial, as

more time

for discovery if needed.

E.

The Damages and Prejudgment Interest Awards Should Be Overturned Because
Did Not Prove the Value of the Commodity Basket
As Tacke argued

in his

opening

brief, the

debt was to be repaid and interest calculated based

on the value of a Commodity Basket, but the Trust has never proven such
this issue, the

new “claim”

the Trust

Trust asserts that Tacke waited until

this

Second Motion

value. Desperate to avoid

for Reconsideration to raise a

or “defense” that the Trust failed to prove damages. (Resp. Br. 27.) However, Tacke does

not assert a claim for relief or an afﬁrmative defense, he merely argues that the Trust failed to prove

an essential element of its breach—of—contract claim. Again,

for reconsideration. Arreguz'

The Trust

z).

also contends that, if this

Appellant’s Brief

rests

are permissible

on a motion

Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 808, 291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012).

Tacke could not challenge the prejudgment
This argument

new arguments

Court believes the 2018 Judgment was
interest

on the premise that the Motion

award

for

in his

Second Motion

a ﬁnal

judgment,

for Reconsideration.

Prejudgment Interest was a motion

to

amend

Page 16 of 21

or alter a judgment under Rules 59(e), 60(a), or 60(b). (Resp. Br. 20.)

if it resolves a

motion under one of those

An order cannot be reconsidered

rules. See I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(2) (stating that the

Court cannot

reconsider orders deciding motions brought under certain rules).

This argument

fails

for a logical reason: the Trust essentially asserts that the district court

could immunize a damage award by failing to include the award in a judgment, enabling a party to ﬁle
a Rule 59(6) or 60

motion

to correct the

judgment. Following the Trust’s

logic, the

order granting

such a motion could not be reconsidered under Rule 11.2(b).

The law does
what

not work that way. Tacke could seek reconsideration of the award regardless of

rule the Trust relied

upon

in ﬁling the

Motion

for

Prejudgment

Interest. (R. at 226.)

This Court

has repeatedly held that a motion to reconsider ﬁled Within fourteen after a ﬁnal judgment can reach

back in time to challenge any interlocutmy order of the

Inc.

7).

trial court,

Whenever entered.

fohnson, 156 Idaho 903, 912, 332 P.3d 815, 824 (2014); Boise Mode,

Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 106—07,

294 P.3d

1111,

1118—19 (2013);

138 Idaho 774, 784—85, 69 P.3d 1032, 1045—46 (2003).

substantive rulings in the case, including the

damages

for

May

unpaid interest in the ﬁrst place. (R.

16,

at

LLC

Elliott v.

v.

E.g. Agrisource,

Donahoe Pace

59°

Darwin Neibaur Farms,

The Second Motion

challenged

all

the

2018 summary—judgment order that granted
93—95, 226.) If the Motion for Prejudgment

Interest merely sought to codify the Court’s substantive

award

Rule 59(e) or 60 motion), then there was nothing to codify

in the

if

form of a judgment (such

the original

as a

summary judgment

is

overturned. If the Motion for Prejudgment Interest was instead a substantive motion for interest

damages

(i.e.,

a Rule 56

summary-judgment motion), then the March

motion would be vulnerable

to a

motion for reconsideration. I.R.C.P.

26, 2019

Order granting

11.2(b)(1). Either

that

way, the award

can be overturned.
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Regarding the substance of Tacke’s argument that the Trust never proved the value of the

Commodity Basket,

the Trust simply contends that Tacke

is

trying to force the Trust to accept speciﬁc

performance. (Resp. Br. 27—28.) Again, the Trust misunderstands Tacke’s position.

He

is

not

suggesting that the Court should actually award gold, silver, and

AUD

argues that the Trust has not proven in U.S. Dollars the damages

suffered for Tacke’s alleged failure

to

pay the debt and

interest,

This Court should vacate

all

it

as a

remedy. Instead, Tacke

both of which are measured solely by the value of the Commodity Basket.

damages and remand the

issue to the district court.

The Award of Costs and Fees Below Should Be Overturned Because
Be a Prevailing Party

F.

In defense of

failed to ﬁle a

its

motion

Costs and Fees, Which

award of costs and

and

to disallow costs

it

fees in the district court, the Trust contends that

fees Within fourteen days of the Trust’s

ﬁled on August 29, 2018. (R.

at 197.)

The

motion
Rule

to reconsider,

The

Which again allows review of “any order of the

11.2 states that there can

in his

if Rule 11.2

Second Motion

motion

to

that

(Resp. Br.

Tacke ﬁled a

I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1).

be no reconsideration of orders resolving motions under certain

but does not include a request for costs or fees

Even

trial court.”

is

among them.

Tacke
of

memorandum.

glaring problem With this argument

Not

Memorandum

trust points out that a

disallow costs and fees must be ﬁled Within fourteen days of service of the

21—22.) I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(6).

the Trust Should

rules,

I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(2).

did not clearly permit Tacke to challenge the award of costs and fees directly

for Reconsideration, logic dictates that he could

do so

indirectly. If this

Court

overturns the damages awards in favor of the Trust, then the Trust Will not be the prevailing party on

its

only cause of action. Consequently,

and only prevailing

Will

no longer be clear that the Trust

parties are entitled to costs

be anomalous not to overturn the

Appellant’s Brief

it

district court’s

and

fees.

is

a “prevailing party,”

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A) and 54(e)(1).

award of costs and

It

would

fees in that scenario. Accordingly,
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if this

Court overturns either component of the Trust’s damage awards,

should also vacate the award

it

of costs and fees pending outcome of proceedings on remand.

G.

The Trust

Is

Not

The Trust

is

not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C.

Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal

§

12—120(3) because

it

should

not be the prevailing party on appeal for the reasons stated throughout Tacke’s brieﬁng. Speciﬁcally,

the damages and interest award should be overturned, and since those claims are central to the Trust’s

lawsuit, the Trust should not

The Trust

also

be the prevailing party.

not entitled to attorney fees under I.C.

is

attorney fees can be awarded on appeal under Idaho

Code

§

12-121. “This

section 12-121 only if the appeal was brought

or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or Without foundation.” Crawford

525,

432 P.3d

right.

.

.

.

67,

Court has held that

7).

Guthmz'ller,

164 Idaho 518,

74 (2018) (quotation omitted). “But attorney fees are not awardable as a matter of

Attorney fees

argument.” Campbell

7).

Will not

Kvamme,

be awarded for arguments that are based on a good

faith legal

155 Idaho 692, 697, 316 P.3d 104, 109 (2013). In this case, Tacke has

pressed good-faith arguments that no ﬁnal judgment existed until the district court entered a judgment

awarding $136k in damages; that the Agreement

is

at best

ambiguous

as to

What happens

in case of

nonpayment; and that the Trust has not proven the value of the commodities against Which Tacke’s
alleged debts are measured. This Court should therefore not award fees

V.

The Trust seems

to believe that

motion that prompted the judgment

document complies With I.R.C.P.

Appellant’s Brief

to

on appeal under

§

12—121.

CONCLUSION

Whether a document

is

a ﬁnal

judgment

is

determined by the

be entered. Instead, the only thing that matters

54(a)(1). Since the

is

Whether the

2019 Judgment was the ﬁrst document to resolve
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all

claims for

relief, it

was the ﬁnal judgment that started the clock on Tacke’s Second Motion

Reconsideration, and indirectly this appeal. Since the Trust has not proven that

damages

it

has been awarded, the 2019

Dated January

10,

Judgment should be vacated and

this case

it

for

was owed the

remanded.

2020
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